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Malice Necessary to Convict for Third-Degree
Murder in Pennsylvania Still Requires Wickedness
of Disposition and Hardness of Heart:
Commonwealth v. Santos
CRIMINAL LAW - THIRD DEGREE MURDER - MALICE - The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that a defendant can be found to
have acted with malice when the evidence shows that he reck-
lessly used a gun in deliberate disregard of the danger posed to
others.
Commonwealth v. Santos, 876 A.2d 360 (Pa. 2005).
On July 21, 1994, on a sidewalk in Philadelphia, Oscar Santos
(hereinafter "Santos") accidentally discharged a bullet into the
head of a six-year old child, who died three days later.1 Santos
had been holding the loaded gun, pushing the slide back and forth,
when the gun fired.2 Gladys Soto (hereinafter "Soto") was stand-
ing near Santos and warned him to stop playing with the gun be-
cause of the danger to the children nearby.3 Within a moment of
Soto's warning, the deadly accident occurred.4
In December of 2001, the police arrested and charged Santos
with murder,5 among other lesser crimes.6 At the preliminary
hearing in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County, the judge
found evidence sufficient to support all of the charges brought by
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (hereinafter "the Common-
wealth").7 The judge relied upon testimony from Soto, who had
1. Commonwealth v. Santos, 876 A.2d 360, 361 (Pa. 2005).
2. Santos, 876 A.2d at 361. Santos and a friend had just returned from a short search
for a vehicle that had sideswiped Santos' car minutes earlier. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Santos fled to the Dominican Republic and was not apprehended until seven
years later. Id.
5. The murder charge was general, under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502, not charging
Santos with a first, second or third degree murder. Id. at 361 n. 1. Under current Pennsyl-
vania law, murder is divided into three degrees - intentional killing, felony murder, and
"all other kinds of murder." See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(a)-(c) (1978).
6. Santos, 876 A.2d at 361. Other charges included possession of an instrument of
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witnessed all events leading up to the shooting,8 as well as a
statement by Santos, in which he admitted to accidentally shoot-
ing the child. 9
Santos filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus' ° and the hear-
ing was held in the court of common pleas in March 2002.1' The
Commonwealth submitted additional testimony from a ballistics
expert who stated that the gun did not appear to have any mal-
functions and would only have fired if Santos had pulled the trig-
ger.12 Applying the prima facie standard, 3 Judge Lerner granted
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as to the murder charge4
and directed that Santos be charged instead with involuntary
manslaughter. 5
In the trial court opinion, 6 Judge Lerner explained that no evi-
dence had been presented to establish either first or second-degree
murder, and that Santos could not be tried for third-degree mur-
der because "no reasonable juror could find a specific intent to kill
or malice from these facts." 7 Referring to Pennsylvania Standard
8. Id. at 361 n.2.
9. Id. at 361.
10. Habeas Corpus is defined as a "writ employed to bring a person before a court, most
frequently to ensure that the party's imprisonment or detention is not illegal." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 569 (7th ed. 2000). In Philadelphia, the common practice is to file a Peti-
tion for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or a Motion to Quash Return of Transcript. Santos, 876
A.2d at 361 n.3.
11. Santos, 876 A.2d at 361.
12. Id. at 361-62.
13. "A prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of
the material elements of the crime charged and establishes sufficient probable cause to
warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense." Santos, 876 A.2d at 363 (citing
Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2003)). A writ of Habeas Corpus can be
granted where the Commonwealth fails to present a prima facie case against the defen-
dant. Santos, 876 A.2d at 363.
14. Santos, 876 A.2d at 362.
15. Id. at 362 n.4. Under Pennsylvania law, a person is found "guilty of involuntary
manslaughter when as a direct result of the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or
grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent
manner, he causes the death of another person." See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504(a) (1995).
When the victim is under twelve years of age, involuntary manslaughter is a felony of the
second degree. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504(b) (1995).
16. This opinion was written according to PA. R.A.P. 1925(a), which states:
Upon receipt of the notice of appeal the judge who entered the order appealed
from, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record, shall forth-
with file of record at least a brief statement, in the form of an opinion, of the
reasons for the order, or for the rulings or other matters complained of, or shall
specify in writing the place in the record where such reasons may be found.
PA. R.A.P. 1925(a) (2005).
17. Commonwealth v. Santos, No. 1129, slip op. at 3 (C.C.P. Phila. County October 7,
2002). See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502. Malice is a common law concept that is incorporated
into the statutory requirements of murder as the mens rea, or mental state element of the
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Suggested Criminal Jury Instruction 15.2502C,18 the judge stated
that under Pennsylvania law, malice can be shown where "a killer
acts with a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty,
recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty,
indicating an unjustified disregard for the probability of death or
great bodily harm and/or extreme indifference to the value of hu-
man life."19 Judge Lerner discounted the Commonwealth's argu-
ment of "transferred malice"" as imaginative but inapplicable be-
cause the facts could not support any finding of malice in the hor-
rible accident that had occurred." The trial judge concluded that
"reckless stupidity is not the same as malice."22
Upon challenge by the Commonwealth, a panel of the Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court affirmed the trial court order in a three-to-
two decision. 2 Judge Bender, author of the opinion, applied prin-
ciples of malice derived from Pennsylvania case law,24 the Model
Penal Code,25 and court decisions of other states. The judge con-
cluded that the Commonwealth had failed to establish malice be-
cause the conduct, although reckless, did not pose "an extremely
high likelihood of death or serious bodily injury." 7 Although
Judge Montemuro dissented and would have found that the prima
facie case had been presented where the facts showed that Santos
crime. Commonwealth v. McGuire, 409 A.2d 313, 315 (Pa. 1979) (the new Crimes Code
that created the offense of third-degree murder incorporated common law malice as an
element). See also Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623, 630 (Pa. 2005) (the law is clear
and well settled regarding the mens rea for third-degree murder, incorporating common law
malice as an element); Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 15 (1868) (common law malice
aforethought is the distinguishing criterion of murder).
18. PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION 15.2502C (1988).
19. Santos, No. 1129, slip op. at 5-6.
20. Id. at 6. The Commonwealth had offered a theory of transferred malice, and argued
that because Santos had not been able to find and shoot the person who had sideswiped his
car, his lingering anger caused him to intentionally shoot the gun in the direction of the
victim. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Santos, 876 A.2d at 362.
24. Commonwealth v. Santos, No. 1322, slip op. at 4-6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2003)
(citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 337 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1975); Drum, 58 Pa. at 9; Common-
wealth v. Seibert, 622 A.2d 361 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).
25. Model Penal Code § 210.1 defines criminal homicide as "purposely, knowingly,
recklessly or negligently caus[ing] the death of another human being." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.1, A.L.I. (2001). Comment to Model Penal Code § 210.2 discusses "depraved-heart
murder" as a category of murder where malice is shown by "extreme recklessness regarding
homicidal risk." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 Comment at 15, A.L.I. (2001).
26. Other states' decisions discussed by Judge Bender included Alabama, Georgia, and
New York. Santos, No. 1322, slip op. at 6-7, 9-10.
27. Id. at 7-8.
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"intentionally engage[ed] in a clearly reckless and malicious
course of conduct,"28 the majority opinion of the superior court
panel asserted that the dissent misapprehended the facts, relying
upon an intentional, rather than an accidental, firing of the gun."
Judge Bender's analysis considered the continuum of the crime of
homicide, from the intentional through the grossly negligent, and
placed the conduct of this case at the lowest end of that range, the
involuntary manslaughter end of the continuum."0
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur3' to consider
whether the trial court had erred when it found no evidence of
malice. 2 The court held that the Commonwealth had clearly pre-
sented evidence sufficient to support the prima facie finding of
malice, defined as a "conscious disregard of an unjustified and ex-
tremely high risk that [the conduct] might cause death or serious
bodily injury."" Reversing the order granting the writ of habeas
corpus, the supreme court remanded the case for further proceed-
ings.'
Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Nigro first focused
upon the reasoning in the appellate court decision. 5 According to
Justice Nigro, the opinion below relied upon a view of malice re-
quired for third degree murder where the state of mind is "nearly
equivalent" to intentional homicide.38 Citing language from the
superior court, Justice Nigro emphasized that the decision below
had been based upon a conception of malice that required a "con-
scious disregard" of the danger that is "essentially the same as
intending the result."37
After illustrating how the court viewed the appellate court's
analysis of malice, the Justice stated the standard and scope of
review of an order granting a writ of habeas corpus. 8 The court
28. Santos, 876 A.2d at 363 (Montemuro, J. dissenting).
29. Santos, No. 1322, slip op. at 16 n.5.
30. Id. at 16.
31. Granting allocatur in the Commonwealth allows appeal to the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, and "[t]he Commonwealth may appeal from a trial court order dismissing a
felony charge based on a pre-trial petition for writ of habeas corpus." Santos, 876 A.2d at
362 n.6 (citing Huggins, 836 A.2d at 865; Commonwealth v. Hess, 414 A.2d 1043, 1047 (Pa.
1980); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 364 A.2d 306 n.2 (Pa. 1976)).
32. Santos, 876 A.2d at 363.
33. Id. at 364 (quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 431 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. 1981)).
34. Santos, 876 A.2d at 365.
35. Id. at 362-63.
36. Id. at 362.




noted that the Commonwealth need not prove guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in a prima facie case against the defendant, but
merely "sufficient probable cause to warrant the belief that the
accused committed the offense." 9 In this type of review, evidence
will be viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth."°
Justice Nigro then began his analysis of malice by contrasting
the requirements to convict a defendant of first-degree murder
with the elements of third-degree murder." The Justice stated
that under Pennsylvania law, first-degree murder requires that
the accused killed another person with the specific intent to kill
the person and with malice, while third-degree murder requires
that the accused killed another with malice, but does not require a
specific intent to kill.42 Stating the rule of law in language that
has been quoted in murder cases for over one hundred years, the
court recognized that it has "long held that malice 'comprehends
not only a particular ill will, but ... [also a] wickedness of disposi-
tion, hardness of heart, recklessness of consequences, and a mind
regardless of social duty, although a particular person may not be
intended to be injured.'"43
To emphasize where the superior court went wrong, Justice Ni-
gro then restated the law of malice required for third degree mur-
der in different language, as where there is "wanton and reckless
conduct [that] manifests . . . extreme indifference to the value of
human life," or where there is no intent to kill but a defendant
"displayed a conscious disregard for 'an unjustified and extremely
high risk that his actions might cause death or serious bodily
harm'"
4 5
Justice Nigro's first illustration of such malice was Common-
wealth v. Taylor.46 In Taylor, the supreme court affirmed the find-
ing of malice when the defendant killed a child with his car while
he was driving under the influence at a high rate of speed on a
road where he knew children were likely to be.4' The court's next
example was a Pennsylvania Superior Court case, Commonwealth
39. Santos, 876 A.2d at 363.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Santos, 876 A.2d at 363 (citing McGuire, 409 A.2d at 315-16).
43. Santos, 876 A.2d at 363 (quoting Ludwig, 874 A.2d at 632).
44. Santos, 876 A.2d at 364 (quoting Taylor, 337 A.2d at 548).
45. Santos, 876 A.2d at 364 (quoting Young, 431 A.2d at 232).
46. 337 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1975).
47. Santos, 876 A.2d at 364 (citing Taylor, 337 A.2d at 548-49).
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v. Scales,45 where the defendant killed a child as a result of driving
at high speeds in a busy residential neighborhood.4' The final case
the court cited was a Pennsylvania Superior Court decision from
1993, Commonwealth v. Urbanski,'° where a collision caused by a
drunk driver killed his wife, who had repeatedly asked him to slow
down.5
After reciting the facts of three reckless driving cases where
malice was found to be sufficient to sustain convictions of third
degree murder, the court concluded that the Santos evidence sup-
ported a prima facie showing of malice5" and reversed both courts'
decisions below.53
The requirement of malice for third degree murder in Pennsyl-
vania has been incorporated from the common law and is not de-
fined by statute.54 The law of malice required for third degree
murder has consistently relied upon a formulation provided in
1868 in Commonwealth v. Drum.55
The evidence of Drum showed that the defendant had killed a
man during a fight outside of a saloon by thrusting a knife into the
man's side.56 Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Agnew57 ex-
plained the legal principles that the jury must apply to the facts,
including the distinction between murder and manslaughter and
the meaning of malice.58 According to Justice Agnew, malice
"comprehends not only a particular ill-will, but every case where
there is wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, reck-
lessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty,
although a particular person may not be intended to be injured."59
Drum was convicted of first degree murder, but the Drum malice
formula encompasses unintentional killings where the facts indi-
cate a depraved heart."
48. 648 A.2d 1205 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
49. Santos, 876 A.2d at 364.
50. 627 A.2d 789 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
51. Santos, 876 A.2d at 364.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 365.
54. McGuire, 409 A.2d at 315. See also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502.
55. 58 Pa. 9 (1868).
56. Drum, 58 Pa. at 21.
57. Justice Agnew was assigned to preside at the trial level because the common pleas
judge was related to the defendant. Id. at 11.
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 14 (murder of the second degree includes "killing under circumstances of
depravity of heart," but manslaughter is a killing without malice or depravity of heart). See
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, Comment at 15, A.L.I. (2001).
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Applying the Drum malice formula in 1946 to an accidental
shooting case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the evi-
dence sufficient to sustain a conviction for third degree murder in
Commonwealth v. Malone."1 In Malone, a seventeen-year-old boy
accidentally shot and killed a thirteen-year-old friend while play-
ing Russian Poker." The evidence showed that the defendant car-
ried a revolver, loaded one cartridge into it, put it to the side of his
companion, and pulled the trigger three times.' The Malone court
first cited to Blackstone's Commentaries to illustrate that under
the common law, malice may be found in "any evil design in gen-
eral; the dictate of a wicked, depraved and malignant heart."'
The court then used the Drum definition of malice to explain mal-
ice under Pennsylvania law and examined the charge of the lower
court. 5 In recognition that the Pennsylvania definition of legal
malice is neither simple nor immediately clear, the court stated
that:
[A] charge may be technically correct and yet be to the
jury meaningless and useless. Many trial judges employ
concrete illustrations to help make clear to the jury what
the issues are which the jury is to decide and how to ap-
ply legal principles to the facts so as to reach a just ver-
dict.
66
The Malone court held that malice could be found in the acts in-
tentionally done by the defendant, in "reckless and wanton disre-
gard of the consequences which were at least sixty percent cer-
tain," even though the defendant had thought that there were
three empty cartridges in the gun." In Malone, the accidental kill-
ing was murder without motive, demonstrating malice without
any particular ill will of the defendant toward the victim.
68
61. 47 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1946).
62. Malone, 47 A.2d at 446. The court describes Russian Poker as:
[A] game in which the participants, in turn, place a single cartridge in one of
the five chambers of a revolver cylinder, give the latter a quick twirl, place the
muzzle of the gun against the temple and pull the trigger, leaving it to chance
whether or not death results to the trigger puller.
Id. at 446 n.1.
63. Id. at 447.
64. Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *199).
65. Malone, 47 A.2d at 447-49 (quoting Drum, 58 Pa. 9).





In a pivotal 1975 case, Commonwealth v. Taylor, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court considered whether the facts of a drunk
driving case established malice as necessary to convict for second-
degree murder.69 Quoting the language of Drum, ° the Taylor
court reiterated the requirement of malice for a murder conviction,
as well as the point that "malice may be inferred and found from
the attending circumstances of the act resulting in the death."7'
The Taylor court found that malice was established beyond a
reasonable doubt in the attending circumstances where the driver
was intoxicated, driving at excessive speed, on a regular route
home from work, in an area between a pool and a park where chil-
dren played, and did not stop immediately after striking two chil-
dren on bicycles who were propelled some distance after impact.72
The court provided an elaboration of the crime of second (now
third) degree murder as follows:
[Bletween the recklessness or culpable negligence neces-
sary to support the charge of involuntary manslaughter
* . . and the specific intent to kill which is a prerequisite
of murder of the first degree, there is a class of wanton
and reckless conduct which manifests such an extreme
indifference to the value of human life which transcends
the negligent killing and reaches the level of malice
which supports a verdict of murder in the second degree.73
Shortly after Taylor, in an effort to depart from the Drum mal-
ice formulation, Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion for the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Hare.74 In
Hare, the sole issue on appeal was whether counsel had been inef-
fective for not challenging the trial court's guilty plea colloquy,
which omitted any reference to the element of malice required for
69. Taylor, 337 A.2d 545. Under current law, this charge would be third degree mur-
der, with no change in the elements required. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502(c).
70. Taylor, 337 A.2d at 546 (citing Commonwealth v. Coleman, 318 A.2d 716, 717 (Pa.
1974); Commonwealth v. Charmansky, 242 A.2d 237 (Pa. 1968); Commonwealth v. Carroll
194 A.2d 911 (Pa. 1963)).
71. Taylor, 337 A.2d at 546 (citing Commonwealth v. Bowden, 309 A.2d 714 (Pa. 1973)).
72. Taylor, 337 A.2d at 548.
73. Id.
74. 404 A.2d 388 (Pa. 1979). Justice Roberts had previously authored a concurring
opinion in Taylor (joined by three other justices) that agreed that malice could be found
where "the appellant consciously disregarded an unjustified and extremely high risk that




murder.75 The court concluded that the colloquy did not inform the
defendant of the nature of malice, which must be explained before
a guilty plea can be accepted for murder under Pennsylvania law.76
Without any citation to Drum, Justice Roberts stated that malice
will be found if an "actor consciously disregarded an unjustified
and extremely high risk that his actions might cause death or se-
rious bodily harm."77 Justice Roberts' definition of malice has
since been included in the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard
Criminal Jury Instructions, alongside the Drum formulation, and
is commonly cited in opinions.78
In 2005, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed its reli-
ance on the Drum formulation of malice in Commonwealth v.
Ludwig.79 In Ludwig, the defendant was charged with third-
degree murder by drug delivery resulting in death.8' The evidence
showed that the teenage defendant sold a double dose of Ecstasy
to a teenage girl without knowing how she would react to it, and
the teenage girl died as a result." In its review of the grant of
Writ of Habeas Corpus, the court stated that "the law is clear and
well settled regarding the mens rea for third degree murder,"2
even when a separate statute had been adopted to create this
crime.83 After quoting the Drum formulation in its entirety, the
Ludwig court found no indication of wickedness, ill-will, cruelty or
extreme indifference to human life in the factors presented. 4 Im-
portant to its analysis was the fact that the girls who bought the
drugs had done so willingly and with knowledge that the pills
were double dosages.85 Among other failures of evidence, the court
found no evidence that a "high probability of death" would result
75. Hare, 404 A.2d at 390.
76. Id. at 391.
77. Id.
78. PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 15.2501A (2) (1988). The
1988 Subcommittee Note states that the appellate courts treat the two definitions as equal.
Id. at 3. But see 15.2501A (5) (2005). The 2005 Advisory Committee Note explains the
reformulated malice instruction is offered to allow courts to abandon the Drum language,
which it finds to be an ineffective instruction. Id.
79. 874 A.2d 623 (Pa. 2005).
80. Ludwig, 874 A.2d at 626. "Drug delivery resulting in death" is a separate criminal
statute defining a distinct form of murder in the third degree. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2506
(1998).
81. Ludwig, 874 A.2d at 632-34.
82. Id. at 630.
83. Id. at 631-32.
84. Id. at 634.
85. Id. at 633.
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from taking Ecstasy.8 The order of the court of common pleas was
affirmed.
7
The cases reviewed here on the issue of malice are within a sub-
class of third degree murder in which the defendant had no ill will
toward the victim and the act that caused the death was not in-
herently vicious. 8 Malice in such cases is to be inferred from the
particular circumstances of the accidental killing. In Malone, evi-
dence was sufficient to show malice beyond a reasonable doubt
where the shooter intentionally placed a gun with one cartridge in
it against the side of his friend's abdomen and pulled the trigger
three times, thinking there were three blanks.89 In Taylor, evi-
dence was sufficient to show malice beyond a reasonable doubt
where the intoxicated driver drove at excessive speeds at three
p.m. on a summer day near a park, struck two boys on bicycles,
killing one, without stopping." But in Ludwig the evidence was
not sufficient to support even a prima facie showing of malice
where the mere sale of illegal drugs to a willing teenage buyer,
who knew of the double dosage, resulted in her death.9'
Would a reasonable juror find malice in Santos, as the unani-
mous supreme court here believed probable, where the defendant
handled a loaded gun in a reckless manner, causing it to fire and
kill a young child nearby? Although clearly a tragic death, neither
the trial court nor the appellate court found any evidence of malice
in these facts and concluded that no reasonable juror could find
malice either.
In spite of the starkly different conclusions that the courts
reached in this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania contin-
ues to assert that the law of malice is clear and well settled, and
comfortably looks at facts to discern "wickedness of disposition" or
86. Ludwig, 874 A.2d at 633.
87. Id. at 634. Justice Nigro's dissent, joined by Justices Saylor and Eakin, argued that
the Commonwealth need not establish malice for every third degree murder and that the
appropriate mens rea in this case is provided by the default provision of 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 302(c) as recklessness. Id. at 635-37 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
88. Typical discussions of depraved heart murder run through a list of examples to
illustrate the type of conduct that falls within that category. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW 668 (3d ed., WEST GROUP 2000); ROLLIN M. PERIUNS & RONALD N. BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW 59-60 (3d ed., Foundation Press, Inc. 1982). Examples could include throw-
ing a brick off a building downtown at lunchtime or shooting into a restaurant at dinner-
time. In either case, the defendant has no intent to murder or cause serious bodily injury,
but malice is inferred from grossly reckless conduct and obvious danger to others.
89. See Malone, 47 A.2d at 449.
90. See Taylor, 337 A.2d at 548.
91. See Ludwig, 874 A.2d at 634.
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"hardness of heart." The Pennsylvania Superior Court, on the
other hand, tried to reconcile the Drum formula with how malice,
as the mens rea component of murder, is currently understood in
other states and in the Model Penal Code.92 These efforts outside
of Pennsylvania discard the common law language of "depraved
heart" murder and use formulas that look at the components of
malice - 1. the nature of the conduct, 2. the type and degree of risk
created, and 3. the defendant's consciousness of that risk.93 The
Model Penal Code recognizes that the primary purpose of any mal-
ice formulation is to "communicat[e] to jurors in ordinary language
the task expected of them."94 Simple and direct language is most
likely to perform that function.
Evaluating the components of malice, the Santos trial court
found no malice in the nature of Santos' conduct; the appellate
court found that the degree of risk created was too slight to imply
a conscious disregard of the possibility of death or serious bodily
injury. This elemental approach to malice is one that juries can
easily understand and evaluate. Without offering analysis other
than by example, however, the supreme court rejected both the
reasoning and the conclusions of the lower courts.
This case is a self-contained demonstration of the unpredictable
and inconsistent outcomes possible when applying the Drum for-
mulation of malice in Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, after Santos,
Pennsylvania judges and juries must continue to detect the pres-
ence of malice through an instinctive moral judgment of the "true"
character of the defendant, of the hardness of his heart. Whether
or not one agrees with the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in this particular case, one should have legal, intellectual,
and moral concerns with the continued use of the Drum standard
of malice in borderline cases like this one. Although well-settled
in the law, "wickedness of disposition" is far from a satisfactory
basis by which to convict anyone of murder in the twenty-first cen-
tury.
Jean M. Mosites
92. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) and Comment at 13.
93. Id. See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 264-74 (Little,
Brown & Co. 1978).
94. MODEL PENAL CODE Comment following § 210.2 at 26.
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